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Falklands ordnance exploitation - January 2017

FALKLANDS ORDNANCE EXPLOITATION – JANUARY 2017

This report and the associated exploitation work were funded by the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In January 2017, exploitation work was carried out by Fenix Insight Ltd on mines and other ordnance
recovered by the Land Release Contractor (LRC).
Examination of grenades used in booby traps revealed that one, considered to be complex and dangerous,
had been rendered safe by the ageing process. The other, though more familiar, was still fully functional
and highly lethal. The findings highlight the continued danger from unexploded ordnance, and the need for
threat assessment to be based on technical evidence rather than intuition.
The LRC had found that a certain batch of P4B anti-personnel mines were more readily detectable than the
types encountered previously. Exploitation established that an additional aluminium capsule was present
within mines produced after 1980. This means that they can be located to depths of 20 cm or more,
substantially increasing the rate of clearance. Inert examples were produced for the LRC and DPO.
Continued testing of fuzes contributed to the body of evidence gathered on previous phases of
exploitation. Of the 100 fuzes tested during this phase, only one was capable of detonating the
main charge. This suggests that the majority of P4B mines are now non-functional, and that the
entire population of these mines is nearing the end of its life. In the unlikely event that
somebody both encountered and actuated a P4B, the likelihood of detonation and resultant injury would
be extremely low.
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FALKLANDS ORDNANCE EXPLOITATION – JANUARY 2017
Introduction
Exploitation1 work for Phase 5a was conducted by Colin King (hereafter ‘CK’), technical director of Fenix
Insight Ltd, from 6-12 January 2017. The ordnance set aside for exploitation by the Land Release
Contractor (LRC) included the following items.
Type

Designation

Country of origin

Grenade

M5

Spain

Grenade

M67

USA

Explosive blocks

Charge, demolition, TNT, 1lb

USA

Anti-personnel (AP) mine

P4B

Spain

Anti-tank (AT) mine

C3B

Spain

Fenix was also asked to examine images taken of Argentine ‘M1’ anti-tank mines encountered during the
previous clearance phase.

Aim
The aim of this report is to outline the findings from the exploitation work, with particular emphasis on:
 The general condition of the ordnance
 The functionality of fuzing mechanisms
 The viability of energetic materials
 Significant changes to characteristics that might affect detectability or sensitivity.

Recovery of Ordnance
Following assessments from previous exploitation work, the P4B AP and C3B AT mines were recovered by
the LRC during clearance operations. The mines were defuzed and stored, with bodies and fuzes in
separate ISO containers, in the holding area.
A booby trap incorporating an M5 grenade, identified and marked in SA108 by the LRC, was neutralised and
lifted by CK. A further booby trap incorporating an M67 grenade was neutralised and recovered from
SA020 by the LRC.
Methodology
Prior to deployment, risk assessments were carried out for each type of ordnance, together with a
provisional plan for disassembly and testing. A specialist tool kit was brought from the UK, with more
common hand tools being bought in the Falklands. Local contacts assisted with the provision of other
equipment such as a workbench, vice, generator and lighting.
As always, the support and cooperation of the LRC was critical to the success of the mission, and included
the provision of equipment, access to Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs) and the provision of a medic.
The work flow followed the standard Fenix process map for exploitation activity, with reviews conducted
as-and-when necessary.

1

In this context, ‘exploitation’ is the characterisation of an item of ordnance; this usually involves disassembly,
examination and testing of components.
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Ordnance disassembly was carried out in an ISO container in Pony Pass quarry, adjacent to the explosive
storage and burning site used by the Land Release Contractor (LRC). Access to the area surrounding the
makeshift Ammunition Processing Building (APB) was controlled during the exploitation process.

The APB was established in an ISO container, in a
disused section of the quarry at Pony Pass

A simple work station was set up, with specialist tools
brought from the UK and others purchased locally

Explosive testing
The explosive testing of P4B detonators was an important part of the exploitation work, building on the
body of data collected during Phase 4a. No matter what the condition of the body, the fuze mechanism or
the main charge, a mine is incapable of functioning as designed unless the detonator is serviceable. The
testing of detonators is therefore critical to the real-world evaluation of the risk currently posed by these
mines, and for the prediction of long-term residual risk.
A rig was improvised, in which a heavy steel rod could be lowered onto a mine fuze in order to actuate it.
The mechanism was operated from a distance by a pulling line, meaning that the operators required only
eye protection. A simple release latch held the rod in the raised position while the fuze was placed on the
anvil, with the latch releasing automatically when the line was pulled. One hundred fuzes were tested
using this method, with video recording used throughout.

The explosive test rig used a rope and pulley to
lower a steel rod onto the mine fuze

A P4B mine fuze placed on the test rig, ready
for the rod to be dropped

2
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EXAMINATION OF ORDNANCE
M5 grenade booby trap
The booby trap consisted of a Spanish M5 grenade, which was wired to two wooden stakes at ground level.
Adjacent to the grenade were two 1-pound blocks of TNT. Unlike other booby traps found to date, the
anchorage of the device used purpose-made stakes made from treated wood and copper wire, both of
which remained in good condition.

The M5 booby trap, prior to recovery

The stakes and wire were still in good condition

The use of treated wood and copper wire means that the grenade is held firmly, which is key to successful
operation should the tripwire be pulled. Without this, the grenade might be pulled out of the ground
without functioning. In this case, the tripwire was absent, having been made from steel and rusted away.
The M5 is a Spanish hand grenade made by Expal (who also manufactured the P4B and C3B mines). It is
unusually complex, incorporating fuzing mechanisms for both impact and delay initiation; this makes it
potentially hazardous to handle. The grenade has a plastic body that can be fitted with a steel
fragmentation cup; in this example, the cup had not been fitted.
The body of the grenade appeared to be in good condition, with no discolouration, cracking or other
external signs of deterioration. The fly-off lever – the primary arming device – had rusted away, revealing
the two arming plungers of the fuze mechanism. These are spring-loaded and designed to move as soon as
the lever is released; their exposure raised the concern that the grenade could be initiated by the slightest
movement.
Before the trap was moved, a block was secured into place to prevent the plungers from moving. The
grenade, and other components of the booby trap were then recovered to the APB for exploitation. Details
of the findings are at Annex A.

M67 Booby Trap
Another booby trap recently encountered by the LRC incorporated an American M67 grenade as the
initiator. This grenade appeared to be in good condition and, being familiar to the LRC, was recovered by
them prior to the Fenix visit, and stored ready for exploitation. Details of the M67 grenade examination are
at Annex B.
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TNT demolition blocks
The TNT blocks used in the M5 grenade booby trap were also recovered for examination. Blocks of this
type were routinely used by Argentine sappers in the construction of booby traps, and many more are likely
to be encountered as clearance work progresses.
The blocks appeared to be in very poor condition, but this was largely due to the degradation of the
cardboard sleeves and the heavily rusted end caps. Internally, the TNT was in good condition, and fully
capable of detonation. The same conclusion was reached during the examination of similar TNT blocks
during a previous phase of exploitation.
Findings from First World War battlefields confirm that high grade TNT can remain intact for more than 100
years. However, TNT requires substantial shock, or other energy input, in order achieve detonation –
especially when it is not encased. The danger posed by these blocks is therefore wholly dependent on the
viability of the primary munition in a booby trap.

Internally, the explosive was still in good condition

The TNT blocks appeared to be heavily degraded

P4B anti-personnel mines
Detectability
Until recently, all of the recovered P4B mine bodies and fuze assemblies were produced in batch number 25-78 (1978 being the year of production). A number of mines from this batch have been examined and
tested during previous phases of exploitation. The detectability of these mines has been very poor,
generally allowing location to a depth of no more than 5 cm, and frequently less. In previous clearance
phases, this meant that detection was not an option, and that all mines had to be located manually by
excavation.
In contrast, a high proportion of the P4B mines cleared during Phase 5a were found to be detectable at far
greater depths (around 20 cm). All of these mines appeared to come from a different lot, namely 1-11-80.
A large number of these mines were recovered and retained for examination during exploitation.

4
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P4B mines from Lot 1-11-80 were found to be far more detectable than the types previously encountered.
The variation in markings was also unusual for mines originating from the same batch.
Functionality
Impact testing was carried out using the explosive test rig, to establish the proportion of fuzes that
remained capable of functioning. This method subjects the fuze (separated from the main charge) to an
impact well above the threshold required for initiation. Only complete fuzes in reasonably good condition
are used, so that the energetic material is being tested, rather than the mechanism. This testing
augmented work from previous phases in order to build a significant evidence base.
Detailed findings from the exploitation of P4B mines are given in Annex C.

C3B anti-tank mines
Three C3B mine bodies and 5 fuzes were made available for exploitation. One of the casings was badly
cracked, but otherwise all components appeared to be in good external condition. The fuze of the C3B is
the same as that of the P4B, except that the mechanism is protected by an outer plastic housing, which
raises the operating pressure to a level more appropriate to an AT mine (approximately 275 kg).
The outer fuze housing provides an additional barrier against the ingress of water, which is normally the
primary cause of degradation within the fuze. This means that, all other factors being equal, C3B fuzes are
likely to remain functional for longer than P4B fuzes.

The protective housing of the C3B raises the operating pressure,
but also helps to keep water out
5
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If the fuze housing cracks, then the operating pressure could be substantially lowered, perhaps to a level
where the mine could be actuated by a person. However, the ingress of water is also likely to accelerate
the degradation of the fuze to the point where it is no longer functional.
The main charge of the C3B tends to remain in very good condition, regardless of cracks in the casing or the
ingress of water. Once again, great variation in explosive composition was encountered, with some parts of
the filling heavily aluminised and others where virtually no aluminium was evident. At present, the metal
dust plays no part in the mine’s detectability and only affects its explosive power. If, at some point, the
metal were involved in a new detection technique, then the variation in content might be significant.

The central booster and main charge in C3B mines
tend to remain in good condition

The distribution of aluminium within the explosive is
very uneven; in some case, virtually absent

Argentinian ‘M1’ mine
The steel-cased Argentinian AT mine used in the Falklands has been nick-named the ‘M1’, due to its
similarity to the US anti-tank mine of that designation; its correct nomenclature is not known.
One example of the ‘M1’ was seen during exploitation in March 2015. The mine had been recovered by the
LRC as an unidentified type, with no fuze and a filling thought to be inert (possibly concrete). The schedule
did not permit full exploitation, but a brief examination confirmed that this was an Argentinian ‘M1’ and
that the filling was TNT.
A field of ‘M1’ mines was encountered during Phase 4 clearance, but no exploitation was conducted that
year. Photos of some mines were taken, permitting some basic analysis; this is given at Annex D.

This mine was recovered
during Phase 4. A brief
examination concluded that
it was an ‘M1’ and that,
what at first appeared to be
an inert filling, was in fact
TNT. No fuze was present
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Creation of inert samples
A number of P4B and C3B mines were rendered inert, including the extraction of initiation compositions
and primary explosive from the detonators. This allowed the construction of inert versions of the
detectable P4B mines for the use of the LRC and DPO.
Some samples of mines, fuzes and components will be returned to the UK, to be held by Fenix for further
research, training and future reference.

A number of inert training aids
were
produced,
including
sectioned P4B mines and inert
mines, reconstructed with
detectable detonator capsules

KEY CONCLUSIONS ON AGEING AND FUNCTIONALITY
Mines
After a certain length of time, all ordnance will eventually lose the ability to function as designed. It may
still incorporate hazardous material for some considerable period, but this is unlikely to constitute a threat
during the course of day-to-day activity.
The period over which an item of ordnance fails will vary, depending mainly on the vulnerability of the
materials and the environment in which they exist. The failure of a large proportion of P4B mines during
testing indicates that most are no longer capable of functioning as designed.
Even among the most robust mine types (the Italian SB-33 anti-personnel and SB-81 anti-tank), testing
during an earlier phase of exploitation revealed that a substantial proportion were now non-functional.
The time scale on the failure distribution curve (see Annex C) is difficult to predict and will differ for each
type of ordnance. However, there is evidence that the degradation process accelerates once water enters
the casing. Thirty five years after the conflict, the vast majority of P4B mines are already non-functional, it
is therefore reasonable to predict that very few, if any, will survive the next 10 years.
Evidence collected during exploitation so far, in conjunction with extensive studies of landmine ageing in
other countries, suggests that the entire population of mines in the Falklands is nearing the end of its
operational life. In the unlikely event that somebody both encounters and actuates a mine at some point in
the future, the risk of detonation and resultant injury is low. That risk will continue to diminish, year on
year.
7
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Unexploded ordnance (UXO)
Findings from the exploitation of the M5 and M67 grenades illustrate the fallibility of intuitive risk
assessment. The M5, considered to be highly dangerous and unpredictable, turned out to be nonfunctional, with multiple points of failure. The M67, being more familiar and therefore considered ‘safer’,
proved to remain highly lethal.
After many years with few serious incidents, the local population are also in danger of becoming somewhat
blasé about the risks from UXO.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Exploitation should be conducted on samples of additional types of mine, and other ordnance, as they are
encountered. Significant types of ordnance not yet examined include:
Designation
BL-755
FMK-1
FMK-3
M1
No 4
No 6

Type
Dual-purpose submunition
Anti-personnel mine
Anti-tank mine
Anti-tank mine
Anti-personnel mine
Anti-tank mine

Origin
UK
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Israel
Israel

Notes
Subject to Convention on Cluster Munitions
Plastic-cased, minimum-metal
Plastic-cased, non-metallic
Steel-cased, vulnerable to degradation
Plastic-cased, resilient
Steel-cased, resilient

Additional functionality testing should be conducted on mines recovered by the LRC during future phases of
exploitation. The resultant data should be charted and analysed in order to establish trends and predict
failure time scales. This may help to quantify the risk from any ordnance that evades the clearance process.
The residual risks posed by types of UXO other than landmines should be analysed and monitored.
Technical findings should be made known to the LRC and EOD community as a whole.
Awareness messages and education on residual risks from UXO should be disseminated to the population
of the Falklands.

Colin King
Technical Director
Fenix Insight Ltd
January 2017
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ANNEX A
EXPLOITATION OF THE M5 GRENADE
Background
The M5 is an unusually complex grenade manufactured by the same Spanish company (Explosivos Alavese
‘EXPAL’ SA) that produced the P4B and C3B mines. Once the safety pin has been withdrawn, release of the
fly-off lever initiates a firing delay, but can also be set to arm an impact fuze. The impact fuze uses an ‘allways acting’ mechanism, so called because it functions no matter what the direction of impact. This makes
it inherently dangerous, and therefore of concern during disposal.

The Spanish M5 grenade. The lower casing of the live grenade is black

Findings
Exploitation revealed that the main charge was in good condition and appeared to consist of Composition B
(RDX/TNT mixture) rather than the pure TNT mentioned in technical references. Composition B is
substantially more powerful than TNT, causing greater blast and, therefore, being far more likely to initiate
the adjacent TNT charges.

The main charge was moulded around every
component, making disassembly difficult

Examination quickly revealed the level of
deterioration within the fuze mechanisms
A-1
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The fuzing mechanisms, however, were heavily corroded and it soon became apparent that neither of the
actuating sequences could function. The primary and secondary arming plungers were seized into place,
with their actuating springs rusted away and no longer capable of applying any force; this means that the
mechanism was incapable of arming as designed.
The delay fuze relies on an arming plunger releasing a spring-loaded slide onto a firing pin; this initiates a
pyrotechnic delay while also bringing a secondary detonator into line. The space into which the slide
moves was filled with aluminium oxide, the slide itself was seized into place and the spring had rusted
away. The delay composition was no longer viable and it is likely that the detonator was also nonfunctional. The same was found with the impact fuze, with all mechanical components corroded and
seized, and energetic elements apparently deteriorated.

All of the major fuzing components were badly corroded and non-functional

Conclusions
The conclusion of these findings was that the M5 grenade was completely incapable of functioning as
designed. Ageing of the complex fuzing mechanism has resulted in multiple points of failure, effectively
rendering the grenade safe. The high explosive charge remained viable; however, there was no internal
means by which it could be initiated.

A-2
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ANNEX B
EXAMINATION OF M67 GRENADE
Background
The M67 is one of a series of grenades, based around similar bodies, but with different fuzing variations.
Most hand grenades are straightforward in design, but some variants of the M67 used a more complex fuze
incorporating an electronic delay function. The markings on the grenade were faint, so the first priority
was to identify the version beyond doubt.

The grenade was in remarkably good condition,
considering its age

The fuze type and markings confirm that the
grenade is indeed a US M67

Examination
Once cleaned, it was clear that the grenade was in surprisingly good condition, with only minimal and
superficial rust in places. Markings were just about discernible and confirmed the identification as an M67.
The fuze was confirmed as an M213 pyrotechnic delay of the type normally associated with the M67.
Removal of the initiation set (the assembly comprising the fuze, detonator, fly-off lever and safety pin)
required a substantial amount of force, but the tight fit and presence of a sealing O-ring had prevented
water from entering the grenade body. This meant that the detonator and main charge were in excellent
condition.
In order to establish the functionality of the fuze, it was mounted onto the explosive test rig so that the
safety pin could be pulled out, using a line, from a safe distance.

Preparing to test the M67 fuze

The result of the detonation

B-1
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Once the pin had been pulled, there was a delay of approximately 4 seconds before the detonator
exploded. This confirmed that the both the fuzing mechanism and the energetic components of the
detonator assembly had been fully functional.
Had the body been fitted, there is no doubt that the grenade would have functioned as intended. Unlike
the anti-personnel mines encountered during clearance work in the Falklands, this grenade has a ‘coined’
(pre-fragmented) steel casing with the potential to cause multiple fatalities.

Making safe
The M213 fuze has the provision for an additional safety clip, which is fitted as standard during
manufacture. It is normal EOD practice to use duct tape to bind the fly-off lever into position on grenades;
however, this is best used as a temporary measure. Duct tape can stretch or creep apart – especially if it is
damp and under tension (as it may be if the safety pin fails for any reason).
The secondary pin hole allows a steel pin or wire to be inserted through the fuze body, directly blocking the
path of the striker. The notch on the fuze body also allows the fly-off lever to be wired into place. The
images below show the locations of these safety features, and how they can be used.

Safety features of the M213 fuze body

Safety wiring with the fly-off lever in place

Conclusions
The remarkably good condition of the M67 grenade was probably due to a combination of materials and
build quality; this means that others may also be well-preserved and fully functional.
Of the various components liable to failure, the safety pin is among the most vulnerable. Failure of the
safety pin could make movement of the grenade extremely dangerous.

Recommendations
The M67 should be considered, and treated as, a high threat item. Its continued functionality and potential
to cause multiple fatalities should be clearly understood.
The render-safe procedure for the M67 should include placement of a steel pin through the secondary pin
hole to positively block the impact of the striker.

B-2
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ANNEX C
EXPLOITATION OF P4B MINES
Background
During the early stages of Phase 5a, a substantial number of P4B mines were located by the LRC and
recovered to their storage facility, awaiting destruction. All of these mines were made available for
exploitation, the aim of which was to focus on their detectability and functionality.

Detectability
When new, the striker spring of the P4B weighs just 0.14 g is detectable to a maximum of 5 cm. Sometimes
the spring cannot be detected at all, and previous exploitation work revealed that many springs have rusted
away altogether. The metallic foil covering the main charge also makes little contribution to the detection
signature. Until now, this minimal detection signature has meant using manual excavation to locate mines.
Early in Phase 5a, it emerged that many of the P4B mines being encountered were detectable to around 20
cm; all of these more detectable mines came from the same production batch: Lot 1-11-80.

The spring in the P4B fuze is only detectable to a
maximum of 5 cm, and many have rusted away

The red metallic foil is a lead/tin/antimony alloy
and is virtually undetectable

In the P4B mines recovered and examined in previous phases, the detonators were pressed directly into the
plastic well of the detonator plug. Examination of the fuzes from mines of lot 1-11-80 indicated that the
detonators were contained in small aluminium capsules.

The detonator compositions of mines from 1978 (left) are pressed directly into the plastic of the
detonator plug, while those of the 1980 mines (right) are contained in an aluminium capsule
C-1
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A number of detonator capsules were extracted from mines belonging to lot 1-11-80, and all of the
energetic material removed. Each capsule is approximately 7mm in diameter and 6 mm high, made from
aluminium alloy and weighing approximately 0.1 g. The capsules were then tested, with the Minelab metal
detector used by the LRC, to establish the distance at which they could be detected.

The detonator capsule from a lot 1-11-80 P4B

Testing the detectability of the capsule

Despite the relatively crude test, it was possible to establish that each of these detonator capsules could be
detected to around 20 cm (in air, with no other detectable material nearby).
When the additional metallic components of the mine (the remains of the spring and foil) were placed in
their normal positions in relation to the capsule, the detection distance often increased. These increases
ranged from 0 (no discernible difference) to 5 cm beyond the distance measured using the capsule alone.

Detonator functionality
Detonator function tests were performed, using the improvised test rig, on a number of fuzes recovered
from different locations; these included fuzes both with and without aluminium detonator capsules. Only
complete fuzes, in good external condition, were selected for the test.
The results were as follows:

Of the 100 fuzes tested, only 3 produced any reaction at all.

Of these, two produced a weak effect, indicating that only the composition in the stab receptor had
been consumed; this had failed to initiate the primary and secondary explosive in the detonator.

Only one fuze functioned fully, and would have detonated the main charge in the mine body.

In two fuzes, only the stab receptor functioned,
with the detonator failing to explode

Of the 100 fuzes tested, only one detonated,
and would have initiated the main charge
C-2
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Conclusions
Detection. The detonator capsules in P4B mines from lot 1-11-80 allow them to be reliably detected to a
depth of 20 cm or more. This has already allowed the LRC to locate mines substantially faster than they
could when using excavation alone.
Functionality. The findings from the functionality testing build on the evidence of previous phases,
confirming that the majority of P4B mines are no longer capable of functioning as designed. The sample
sizes are too small to have real statistical significance and other factors, such as location and immediate
environment, may be influential. However, exploitation and testing appears to indicate that the proportion
of mines remaining functional is decreasing noticeably, year on year.
This would support the expectation that the rate of failure among mines is following a normal distribution
curve, and that the current position is well towards the end of that curve, as shown in the illustration
below.

The decline in mine functionality is expected to follow a normal distribution curve. Testing indicates that
most P4B and C3B mines have already reach the end of their functional life
FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY
Residual risk. It is not possible to put precise timelines on the degradation process, nor to predict the
overall proportion of mines affected, although additional data may allow more accurate assessments. But
it is clear that the residual risk is declining, and that – even now - an accidental encounter with a P4B is
unlikely to result in detonation. In future decades, this risk is likely to approach zero.
Although they are very unlikely to be initiated by normal activities, non-functional mines should not be
considered ‘safe’. The fuzes and bodies still contain high explosive with the potential to cause destruction
and injury. Detonations during the burning process used for disposal by the LRC prove that the majority of
the explosive components are still capable of functioning, if they are subjected to sufficient energy.

C-3
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ANNEX D
ANALYSIS OF ‘M1’ MINE IMAGES
Background
The following photos were taken of ‘M1’ mines encountered by the LRC during Phase 4. No exploitation
was carried out and CK did not see these mines in the field; however, some basic deductions can be made
from the images.

Analysis
Observation
Most images show mines in flat, stable locations,
within the bounds of expected burial depths, and
with the main assemblies present.
Deduction
This suggests that they have remained largely
undisturbed, and that the only significant influences
will have been environmental.

Observation
Some mines are heavily degraded, to the point
where even thick steel sections have rusted through.
Deduction
This generally appears to be the case with mines on,
or near, the surface. In the unlikely eventuality that
the fuze were functional, these heavily degraded
mines may have lost the structural integrity needed
in order to function.

Observation
Although many mines are heavily rusted, a number
appear to be in good condition, with external painted
surfaces showing only superficial corrosion.
Deduction
The extreme differences in condition are surprising,
since the mines are likely to have very similar
characteristics, and all mines have been subjected to
similar conditions for the same duration. It appears
that burial can slow the degradation process.

D-1
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Observation
The casing of this mine is empty; there is a
pronounced upward bend in one of the bars of the
‘spider’, while the other bar has been displaced.
Deduction
The main explosive charge has almost certainly
burned away, blowing out the large round filling
plugs in the top surface. Any remaining paint would
have been burned off during the fire, rendering the
casing more vulnerable to corrosion. Since this mine
is on the surface, yet only lightly rusted, it appears
that the fire was fairly recent. The damage to the
spider bars was probably caused by explosion of the
detonator. This indicates that the primary explosive
was still viable at the time of the fire.

Conclusions
Energetic components. The booster and main charge of the ‘M1’, believed to be TNT, are likely to remain
serviceable indefinitely. The evidence of detonation seen in one burned-out mine indicates that the
primary explosive of the detonator may also be functional. Whether or not the initiating composition
within the detonator remains viable will be dependent on how well sealed this assembly is.
Mechanical components. The type of fuze mechanism used in the ‘M1’ is not yet known, but the
expectation is that any metallic components would have degraded to the point where the mechanism could
no longer operate. The presence of casings in good condition introduces some uncertainty regarding the
condition of fuzes.

Recommendations
Examples of ‘M1’ mines in good condition should be recovered for exploitation, the purposes of which
should be to:










Characterise the mine (external appearance, dimensions, weight, markings etc)
Photograph external appearance and internal components
Confirm the composition and viability of the main charge and booster
Determine the type of operating mechanism used in the fuze
Examine fuze components to assess functionality
Test the functionality of detonators
Establish whether there is a link between condition (or rate of degradation) and burial depth
Assess likelihood of any ‘M1’ mines remaining functional
Consider implications for clearance methods.
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